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III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN ANSWER TO MATTERS 
SET FORTH IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF. 
No evidence exists in the record to support Respondent's 
argument that the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 
was remedial or that appellate courts were confused about the 
pre-1984 version of Section €9. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court 
interpretation and application of the pre-1984 version of 
Section 69 are clear and unequivocal. Appellants' rights 
vested at the time of the injury and those rights are in the 
nature of contractual rights. The employer's rights and 
liabilities are equally as substantive as those of the injured 
employee. For purposes of determining the employer's liability 
and to meet the purposes of Section 69, the employer is 
entitled to rely on a strict application of the statute as it 
existed at the time of the injury. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT FIND THAT 
THE 1984 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 69 WAS 
REMEDIAL. 
The Second Injury Fund stated that the Industrial 
Commission "properly found" the amendment to Section 69 to be 
"remedial." Respondent's Brief, p. 7. The Second Injury Fund 
fails to cite any such finding in the record. A careful review 




NEITHER THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION NOR THE 
APPELLATE COURTS WERE CONFUSED ABOUT THE 
PRE-1984 VERSION OF SECTION 69. 
The Second Injury Fund asserts that the 1984 amendment to 
Section 69 was enacted to remedy confusion resulting from 
appellate court decisions construing Section 69. The Second 
Injury Fund fails to identify any evidence or legislative 
history supporting this assertion. Instead, the Second Injury 
Fund makes a blanket assertion that three Utah Supreme Court 
cases demonstrate confusion. A review of those cases shows 
that no confusion existed. 
In Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 639 P.2d 
138 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the pre-
1981 version of Section 69 in apportioning liability between 
the employer and the Second Injury Fund for a permanent total 
disability claim. The Court did not find Section 69 to be 
confusing. Nor have subsequent cases demonstrated any confu-
sion with that decision. In Jacobsen Constr. v. Hair, 667 P. 2d 
25 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the 1981 
amendment to Section 69 in determining the proper reimbursement 
rate for temporary disability and medical expenses from the 
Second Injury Fund to the employer. The formula established 
was clear and unequivocable. The Court did not find Section 69 
to be confusing. Nor has any court interpreted Hair to be 
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inconsistent with Northwest Carriers. Nor have subsequent 
cases demonstrated any confusion with this decision. 
In Kerans v. Industrial Comm'n, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1985), 
the Court interpreted the 1981 amendmenjt to Section 69 in 
determining what portion of a permanent partial impairment 
should be paid to the employee by the employer and the Second 
Injury Fund. It has never been suggested that the Kerans 
decision was inconsistent with the Northwest Carriers decision. 
In addition, the Court specifically found that Hair was not 
inconsistent with Kerans. Nor have subsequent cases demon-
strated confusion with this decision. 
Northwest Carriers, Hair, and Kerans address different 
issues raised by Section 69. The decisions are not in 
conflict; nor are they confused. Northwest Carriers and Kerans 
are still applicable under the 1984 amendment to Section 69. 
The Industrial Commission has been able to implement all three 
of these decisions in numerous cases. Ironically, the 1984 
amendment which purportedly resolves confusion does just the 
opposite. As indicated by an Industrial Commission internal 
memorandum, the 1984 amendment provisions dealing with appor-
tionment provide two arguable bases for computation. R. at 
63-64. If anything, the 1984 amendment, rather than its 
predecessor, is confusing. 
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POINT III 
HARTFORD'S RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 69 WERE 
VESTED AND CANNOT BE DESTROYED RETROACTIVELY. 
The Second Injury Fund does not controvert the fact that 
the numerous cases cited in Appellants' Brief have held that 
Section 69 and its amendments are substantive and therefore 
cannot be applied retroactively. Rather, the Second Injury 
Fund cites an unpublished decision to support its assertion 
that the 1984 amendment was remedial. That case is factually 
and legally distinguishable. 
In Alter v. Hales Sand and Gravel, No. 870013-CA (Utah App. 
filed November 23, 1987), this Court found that an amendment to 
Section 68 was remedial and therefore retroactive. Hales' 
daughter was killed in an industrial accident. Hales objected 
to the Section 68 requirement that because his daughter had no 
dependents he was obligated to pay $30,000 to the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund to cover uninsured employers, including his 
competitors. Hales successfully lobbied the Utah Legislature 
to eliminate this requirement. The amendment became effective 
eleven months after his daughter's death. This Court found 
that the amendment was intended to remedy the injustice of 
requiring an employer to pay for the losses sustained by 
employees working for uninsured employers. This Court also 
found that the Uninsured Employers Fund had no vested right to 
the $30,000 until one year after the employee's death. Because 
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the amendment was enacted before a year had elapsed, the 
Uninsured Employers Fund had no vested right that would have 
been destroyed by retroactive application of the statute. 
Hales is entirely different from this case. Here 
Hartford's right to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund 
is not contingent upon a period of time elapsing. Hartford's 
rights vested immediately. Unlike Hales, retroactive applica-
tion of the 1984 amendment would destroy those vested rights. 
In addition, as discussed above, unlike Hales, no evidence has 
been presented in this case to show that the 1984 amendment was 
intended to remedy an injustice. 
The Second Injury Fund also argues that because the 1984 
amendment does not change the benefits received by the 
employee, it is procedural. This argument assumes (1) that had 
the 1984 amendment changed an employee's benefits it would have 
been substantive, and (2) that the amount of benefits going to 
the employer is not substantive. The Second Injury Fund's 
first assumption is correct. However, its second assumption 
lacks any rational basis. No argument in reason or justice 
explains why an employee's rights would be substantive, while 
an employer's would not be. Such an argument presents serious 
due process and equal protection deficiencies especially where 
an employer foregoes the right to assert legal defenses in 
injury cases under a quid pro quo of the no-fault statutory and 
contractual scheme. As illustrated in this case, the 
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"procedural" rights which the Second Injury Fund dismisses 
amount to a difference of $20,264.38. The Utah Supreme Court 
has consistently held that under Section 69, the "rights and 
liabilities of the parties are determined on the basis of the 
law as it existed at the time of the occurrence." Kaiser Steel 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 709 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1985). 
The very purpose of Section 69, to encourage employers to hire 
people who have a pre-existing injury, suggests that an 
employer is entitled to rely on a strict application of the 
statute existing at the time of the injury so that no 
substantive rights are impaired. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully submit that Section 69, as it 
existed at the time of the injury, fixed substantive rights in 
the employer that cannot be impaired by retroactive application 
of the 1984 amendment to Section 69. For these reasons, 
Appellants request a reversal of the Industrial Commission's 
retroactive application of the 1984 version of Section 69 and 
request apportionment according to the 1981 version of Section 
69. 
DATED this Jj- day of OrJ^^Li^^ • 1988-
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Stuart L. Poelman 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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%\ INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
NORMAN H. BANGERTER. GOVIKNOK rone* UHAU*Y. o-uiucm 
UL«trXCDI%4BBON?* 
jaw nctr XUJSSOKH 
MBfOBABBOM 
T O : administrative Law Judges 
Erie V. Booraanf Administratorv second Injury Fund 
Suxan Pixton, Administrator, Uninsured Employers Fund 
Barbara El icer io , Ltgal Counsel 
FS"1,-!" II,,; h"1""" i"1 " •'• Administrative Law Judge 
DAT) October i , !,"« ' 
HE; wards of Cornper.sation and Reimbursement Under 35-l~69 
Under the 1 ast two sentences of the first paragraph of Sect a on 35-3-69, 
effective from and after March 29, 1984, j t is clear that: 
] The liability of the employer or insurance earriar shall 
be based on the impairment attributable to the industri.il 
injury on a whole person uncombined1 basis^Z^T . 
i itntitiement of the employee Twill be based on the 
total impairment rating on a (combined")basis, utilizing 
the combined values chart in the AHA Guidelines. A& *£*- / / ** ^*l 2? 
* The liability of the Second Injury Fund for permanent 
partial impairment payable to the j injured employee shall 
be for the remaining percentage of impairment obtained by 
deducting the employer's uncombined impairment rating 
from the total combined impairment rating. 
KP^T* If *&e employee's iapaiment is rated at 101 from the industrial 
injury on an uncombined basis and 10% due to pre-existing conditions on an 
uncombined basis, the total impairment for which the applicant will be 
entitled to payment for aggravated injuries will be 191 with 101 being paid by 
the employer or carrier and 91 being paid by the Second Injury Fund. 
Reimbursement to the employer or carrier for temporary total and medical 
expenses shall be 9/19 of the total sum expended 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION DfYISiON .
 ( S 0 | ) 53O4S00 
160 LAST 300 SOUTH • P.O. SOX 45530 • SALT LAKE OTY% UTAH 14145^)5*0 
MEfORASDUM 
F20M: Hi chard Suasion 
PAGE: Two 
It is recognized that tha saeond santanea of paragraph 2 of Saction 6? 
in tha 1984 amendment is suscaptibla of a different irttrpruta^ion vith 
raspaet to apportionmant of liability between tha carrier or awloyer ard tha 
Saeond Injury Fund. By itsalf
 f this santanea can reasonably b* eonstruad as a 
basis for apportioning tha employer's liability and tha Saeond Injury Fund's 
liability on the basis of whole parson, uncombined, ratings so that in tha 
example abova tha employer would be entitled to raimbursamant for 10/20 of the 
amounts expended rather than 9/19. 
It is the consensus of the Administrative Law Judges that such an 
interpretation creates an illogical anomaly and that apportionmant should be 
made utilizing tha same ratios upon which compensation is paid. 
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